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A Prayer for Marie:
Creating an Effective
African Standby Force
MIKE DENNING

O

n 16 April 1994 in Cyahinda, Rwanda, 3,500 unarmed Tutsi men, women,
and children packed into a small Catholic church, and 4,000 more crowded
into surrounding church buildings, to escape from the Rwandan army and its
death squads. Discovering their whereabouts, the death squads came with guns,
machetes, and clubs, surrounded the parish buildings, and attacked the helpless
families within. In a methodical and almost leisurely manner, they systematically murdered one day’s quota, only to return the following three days to complete the killing. At the end of four days, 5,500 unarmed men, women, and
children lay dead. Among them was Marie, a six-year-old girl who had been tortured and raped. She had bled to death after having her legs cut through above the
knees with a machete.1
There were nearly 100,000 “Maries” in 1994 Rwanda—children who
faced an unimaginable death. This horror was repeated time and time again
over the course of 13 weeks, when approximately 800,000 people were massacred in Rwanda’s genocide. By August 1994, three million Rwandans had
been internally displaced, and more than two million had fled to neighboring
countries—out of a total pre-war population of approximately seven million.
Women and children suffered most from the aftermath of the genocide, with an
estimated 47,000 children orphaned, and up to 500,000 women raped.2 Unimaginably, this occurred as the international community watched with a fixed,
if not disinterested eye. After the Rwanda genocide, the United Nations released a report which concluded that a small outside force—perhaps as few as
5,000 soldiers—could have intervened and stopped the slaughter in its early
stages. The failure of the United States and the international community to act
is one of the most shocking instances of indifference in history.
102

Parameters

While the Rwanda tragedy is unparalleled with regard to the killers’
speed and “efficiency,” there is nothing new about violence on the African continent. In fact, no region of the world has seen a greater number of foreign or US
military interventions in the past decade than Sub-Saharan Africa. Since 1991,
US forces have conducted 31 contingency operations in Sub-Saharan Africa
alone.3 In terms of almost every meaningful measurement—the number of countries with internal disputes, the number of UN peacekeeping missions, the number of civilian casualties, the number of displaced civilians, or the monetary cost
to the international community—Africa has been the most likely location for the
requirement for armed humanitarian intervention over the past ten years.4

Why Africa Matters to the United States
The current US National Security Strategy (NSS) addresses the African paradox. The strategy describes Africa as a land of “promise and opportunity,” but also as a land beset with “disease, war, and desperate poverty.” The
NSS goes on to say that the current situation in Africa poses a threat to a core
value of the United States—preserving human dignity—and to a strategic priority—combating global terror. As a result, the National Security Strategy
makes a bold commitment: The United States “will work with others for an African continent that lives in liberty, peace, and growing prosperity.” That said,
Africa remains at the bottom of any list of America’s vital interests. Does the
evidence justify this low priority?
Africa matters far more today to US interests than it did before 11
September 2001, and America’s gaze needs to include this vast continent in
its present national security landscape. As the campaign against global terrorism unfolds, we find Sub-Saharan Africa clearly among the terrorists’ playing fields. Just as the failed state of Afghanistan spawned terrorist camps in
the 1990s, so has Africa’s plight led to increased terrorist activity. Consider:
l Dr. Jakkie Cilliers writes in African Security Review that 2,800 Algerians were trained in Afghanistan, “making Algeria the third biggest contributor of foot soldiers to international terrorism after Saudi Arabia and Yemen.”5

Lieutenant Colonel Mike Denning, USMC, is an AH-1W (Cobra) pilot who recently returned from Iraq with Task Force Tarawa. Prior to that, he served four years with
Marine Light/Attack Helicopter Squadron-269, two years as the Commanding Officer
and two years as the Executive Officer. Lieutenant Colonel Denning started his Marine
Corps career as an artillery officer with 4th Battalion, 11th Marines. His staff experience
includes Headquarters Marine Corps as the Assistant Secretary, General Staff for the Director, Marine Corps Staff at the Pentagon. He graduated with distinction from the US
Naval War College, where he earned an M.S. degree in national security affairs, and he
served as a National Security Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government.
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“Approximately 800,000 people were massacred
in Rwanda’s genocide. . . . A small outside
force—perhaps as few as 5,000 soldiers—could
have intervened and stopped the slaughter
in its early stages.”

l Al Qaeda elements and sympathizers have been “active throughout
much of Africa with known cells in Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Kenya, Tanzania,
Uganda, South Africa, Cote D’Ivoire, [and] Mauritania”6 and continue to grow
in countries such as Kenya, Tanzania, and the Sahel region.7 Porous borders additionally exist in Sudan, Somalia, northern Nigeria, and South Africa, which
must be addressed with a comprehensive and integrated US military strategy.8
l The 1998 bombings of the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar
es Salaam killed more than 200 people and injured some 4,000. The bombings
brought Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda into public awareness, and prompted
US cruise missile strikes on terrorist targets in Sudan and Afghanistan.
In addition to current terrorist activity, Africa is a hotbed for recruitment of tomorrow’s terrorist. While radical militant Islam has so far had little
resonance with the nearly 250 million African Muslims, there are some strands
of traction. Most of Africa’s Muslims, like their non-Muslim African brethren,
are impoverished and live in acute—and worsening—marginality that invites
inter-ethnic strife, despair, and resentment of the West. During the past decade,
frustrated Muslims living under corrupt, malfunctioning governments have
looked increasingly to Islamic agencies funded by Saudi and other Persian
Gulf donors to provide education, health, social welfare, and security.9 This
phenomenon has often stabilized communities and enhanced the local legitimacy of Muslim social activism. At the same time, it has provided the means to
mobilize anti-US and anti-Western sentiment and has created havens for militant actors who endeavor to act in solidarity with al Qaeda.

AIDS and National Security
The AIDS pandemic has a complex but important nexus to US national security. AIDS and warfare insatiably feed off each other—warfare is
an amplifier of the disease, and the disease can create the conditions favorable for warfare.10 The disease hollows out military capabilities, as well as
state capacities in general, weakening both to the point of failure and col104
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lapse. For instance, estimates of HIV infection rates among African armies
are as high as 50 percent in the Congo and Angola, 66 percent in Uganda, 75
percent in Malawi, and 80 percent in Zimbabwe.11 This hollowing-out of militaries, particularly at the leadership level, has a number of added implications
for security. As human capacity is lost, combat readiness deteriorates. Ultimately, AIDS-weakened militaries pose the risk of domestic instability and
may even invite foreign attack.
AIDS threatens not only the military, but the whole state. As the disease spreads and becomes even more pervasive, it attacks the nation’s fiber—
individuals, families and communities, economic and political institutions,
and police forces. The consequences can be shattering for already impoverished states. The World Bank considers AIDS to be the single biggest threat to
economic development in Africa: the disease is expected to reduce GDP in
many states by as much as 20 percent in the next decade.12 This weakening of
state bodies at points of crisis has repeatedly been the spark for coups, revolts,
and other political and ethnic struggles to secure control over scarce resources—the precursor for a humanitarian crisis. As the collapse of the Democratic Republic of Congo—largely due to the AIDS epidemic—illustrates,
warlords and other violent actors can move in to fill the void left by a failing
state.13 This becomes a direct threat to US national security when these failed
states become havens for the new enemies of global order.
Economic Considerations
Africa potentially has important economic contributions to US security as it matures into an economic partner. The United States has economic
investments throughout the region—by some measures, comparable to investments in the Middle East or Eastern Europe.14 Additionally, Africa is a
large and growing source of non-Gulf oil: currently the central/west African
basin accounts for 17 percent of US oil imports. According to the National Intelligence Council, the United States is likely to draw 25 percent of its oil
from West Africa by 2015, surpassing the volume imported from the Persian
Gulf.15 Plans call for an estimated $40 billion in new US private investment in
the energy sector in Africa in the next few years, when production and imports in and from this region are expected to rise steadily.
Conversely, Africa’s present economic plight is disheartening. SubSaharan Africa remains the world’s poorest region, with a GDP per capita
income of just $575 in 2002.16 Additionally, Africa’s autocratic governance
and economic marginality pose a serious threat to US security interests. In the
near to medium term, these vexing factors are expected to only worsen. In the
midst of a global economic downturn aggravated by the aftermath of 9/11, the
World Bank predicts the worst impact will be felt in Africa.17 Programs like the
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Africa Growth and Opportunity Act, targeted specifically at the Sub-Saharan
region, are critical to stem this potential crisis.
Clearly, the United States can no longer afford to marginalize Africa’s
contribution—good and bad—to our national security posture. We need to make
fundamental changes to the way we execute our military strategy toward
Sub-Saharan Africa. Without these changes, key US national security interests
will not be achieved and we will abdicate the responsibility to prevent another
Rwanda to the same international community which stood by helplessly in 1994.

The African Union Proposal
Against the grim backdrop of the past decade, African leaders have
come to the realization that the international community and the United Nations cannot be depended upon to stop the suffering of Africans. One clear and
lasting lesson for the continent is that the cost of being dependent on others for
intervention is unacceptably high. With this in mind, African Union (AU) leaders have called for the creation of the African Standby Force (ASF), a multinational armed force comprised solely of African soldiers capable of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations—an African solution for African
problems. The conceptual ASF provides for five sub-regional standby brigades (3,000 to 4,000 troops), which will provide the AU with a combined
standby capacity of 15,000 to 20,000 peacekeepers.18
The ASF brigades are to be formed by the countries within the respective regions. Since these brigades are to reside in the regions that they serve and
protect, the standby force, in theory, will be able to quickly organize, deploy,
and intervene to stem early violence before it erupts into full-scale war. The development of the African Standby Force is to occur in two phases. Phase I extends to 30 June 2005, by which time the regions are to develop a standby
brigade capacity, while the AU develops the capacity to manage monitoring
missions, akin to UN observer missions. Phase II extends to 30 June 2010, by
which time regions are to refine their standby brigade capabilities, while the
AU develops the capacity to manage a complex peacekeeping operation.19 The
AU acknowledges that some regions will take more time to develop a standby
brigade, and the African Chiefs of Defense Staff (ACDS) recommends that, as
a stopgap arrangement, designated lead nations form coalitions of the willing
pending the establishment of the regional brigades.20
International Response
As the AU and African regions look to field the African Standby
Force, the significant costs related to its establishment led African leaders to
seek support from the international community at the June 2003 G8 Summit
in Evian, France. Although an “African-boots” force is the preferred military
106
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“Just as the failed state of Afghanistan spawned
terrorist camps in the 1990s, so has Africa’s
plight led to increased terrorist activity.”

intervention solution—preferred by African leaders and the international
community alike—the international response to this initiative has been lukewarm. Recognizing the gaps between current and desired capabilities, the G8
indicated they consider the proposal to be overly ambitious and expensive.21
The G8 response to the AU proposal was not surprising. The ASF initiative lacked detail, such as the member countries per region, the countries acting as lead nations, and a program of objectives and milestones for the
development of the force. Most significantly, the ASF initiative—specifically
the development of five regional brigades capable of rapid deployment and humanitarian intervention—is an incredible reach given regional capacities as
they exist today.22
While many African militaries are rich in peacekeeping experience
and leadership talent, their inability to organize and deploy rapidly reflects
the relative poverty of their states. Individual country budgets rarely are sufficient to provide adequate living standards for military personnel, to acquire
and maintain equipment, or to undergo realistic, large-unit training. Outside
of South Africa and perhaps Nigeria or Ghana, few African states are capable
of mobilization, regional power projection, or sustained, intense military operations.23 Moreover, regional military success stories are few and far between. For example, the Economic Community of West African States
Monitoring Observer Group (ECOMOG), largely considered to be the most
capable regional peacekeeping force, has demonstrated mixed results at best
in its peace enforcement capacity. During its UN missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, it failed to maintain neutrality toward the Liberian factions, had
500 peacekeepers captured by rebel forces, and was seen by other African nations as simply a cover for the spread of Nigerian influence.24
So is the ASF initiative dead in the water? Not completely. While the
G8 did not offer the AU a blank check, neither did its members categorically
dismiss the ASF initiative. One senses that if an alternate proposal were
presented—a proposal that satisfies the operational requirement, is within
Africa’s reach, and is fiscally prudent—the G8 would be much more receptive. In developing such an alternative, certain fundamental questions should
Winter 2004-05
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be addressed—what capabilities does an ASF need; how should it be organized, trained, and equipped; and what role should the United States play in
bringing it to fruition? These are all legitimate questions which need to be
considered before one can expect international and US buy-in.
Capabilities Required: Speed and Teeth
With the hindsight of historical African conflict, any credible ASF
alternative should contain two distinct capabilities—the ability to organize
and deploy rapidly and the ability to conduct Chapter VII operations.25 The
need for speed is self-evident. An effective African Standby Force must be
able to arrive within days of being needed, not months. While the conflicts in
Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) each offer testimony to this distinction, Rwanda is certainly the most gruesome example. In the days that followed the 6 April 1994 airplane crash killing
Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana—the event which triggered the
genocide—the violence widened until the entire country was engulfed in a
killing spree. In the course of 100 days, approximately 800,000 Rwandans
were killed—a pace of 8,000 killings per day. As Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and DRC bear witness, most civilian casualties occur during the early
months of conflict.26 Thus, creating an ASF for speed—speed of organizing,
deploying, and operating—is essential to success.
The second capability for an effective ASF is that it must be constituted of warfighters. Far too often, intervening forces are deployed to a Chapter
VII environment with Chapter VI authority—and the results are inevitable—
soldiers legally helpless to counter the bloody and humiliating events of Sierra
Leone, Somalia, and Goradze. A Chapter VII-capable force is documented in
the Brahimi Commission’s report on United Nations Peace Operations: “UN
peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandate professionally and successfully. Rules of engagement should be sufficiently robust and not force UN
contingents to cede the initiative to their attackers. This means that mandates
should specify an operation’s authority to use force.”27

A Workable Alternative—The Tier One Brigade
Using “speed and teeth” as the core competencies, an African
Standby Force could be created to achieve the economies that the G8 desires
and meet the sense of urgency that the African security environment demands.
This proposal—the Tier One Brigade28—calls for creating a single standby brigade, not five, designed for rapid response and Chapter VII capability throughout the continent.
One rapid-response standby brigade capable of Chapter VII peace
operations would be a preferable alternative to the AU proposal for several rea108
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Organization:

Battalions are drawn from “lead nations.” Brigade leadership is
designated by the AU.

Command
& Control:

Permanent standing headquarters develop contingency plans
and conduct pre-crisis planning.

Training:

Brigade is trained together by the international community using
common training and doctrine. Capabilities examined during the
final evaluation are drawn from Joint Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Peace Operations, Joint Pub 3-07.3, and NATO’s
AJP-3.4.1, Peace Support Operations. Sustainment training is
completed through international peacekeeping exercises.

Logistics:

Brigade operates common equipment sourced through the international community. Prepositioned supplies and equipment are
maintained at a central logistics facility. Brigade logistics site
location is based on access to port facility, commercial airfield,
centralized logistics facility, and roadway and telecommunications network maturity.

Figure 1. Notional Tier One Brigade.

sons. First, a brigade-sized force is recommended throughout research conducted on the nature of African conflict. Based on historical regional conflict,
UN military planners assessed that a brigade is the right-sized force to intervene effectively in most humanitarian crises that have occurred on the continent.29 Second, a brigade-sized force can be assembled from existing battalions
among African militaries. Third, this standby force could be created with much
less capital than is currently expended on individual countries’ disparate initiatives. And foremost, this force could be operational within one year of the commencement of training—not the five years which the AU plan proposes. The
basic concept for the Tier One Brigade is shown in Figure 1.
Organization
While organizing the Tier One Brigade from any single African
country would be a daunting challenge, developing it from the composite African community is within reach. While most African countries have limited
military capabilities, and few have the capacity to undertake or contribute to a
robust peacekeeping or enforcement operation, there are “anchor” countries
that can provide the foundation for potential regional capabilities. The Western Region, anchored by the capable Nigerian and Ghana armed forces, has
already exhibited the capacity to assemble and deploy effective intervening
forces throughout Africa. In the Southern Region, South Africa has significantly increased its peacekeeping presence over the past two years, jumping
to the tenth overall largest UN peacekeeping nation.30 South Africa’s entry
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into the peacekeeping world is significant in that it adds both a considerable
amount of resources to the AU and Southern Africa Development Community, and a military force experienced in large-unit operations. And in the
Horn of Africa (HOA) region, Ethiopia is considered a “new strategic partner” with the most capable military in that region.31
While the African Union will ultimately identify the sourcing countries, the international community should request that the battalions come
from “lead nations”—a step the AU included in its initial African Standby
Force proposal. US policy in Sub-Saharan Africa under the Bush Administration has been built around developing the capabilities of Nigeria, South Africa, Ethiopia, and Kenya—the United States’ choice for lead nations.32 These
countries possess capable militaries and enjoy significant influence throughout their regions. Although the international community has not collectively
identified Sub-Saharan lead nations, G8 engagement with these same African
nations suggests consensus. Moreover, earmarking a battalion for the Tier
One Brigade from a lead nation creates less of a void than would otherwise be
created if the battalion were taken from a country with a smaller military.
Command and Control
As the backbone for the Tier One Brigade’s continuity and planning,
a permanent standing headquarters should be fielded. In practical terms, this
headquarters would conduct pre-crisis planning for the focus areas directed
by the African Chiefs of Defense Staff. There are two models available for a
permanent standing headquarters. In the US military, the “standing joint
force headquarters” (SJFHQ) concept has been formalized by after-action reports from nearly every joint operation that the services have participated in
over the past ten years.33 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld recently directed the formation of Standing Joint Force Headquarters for all the regional
Combatant Commands by fiscal year 2005. Approaching operational capability, the US SJFHQ model contains a 58-member team specializing in operational planning and information command and control.
Besides the US SJFHQ, the African Union can also examine the
UN’s Standby Force High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), which maintains
an 11-member permanent “planning element.” Since the US model contains
leading-edge command and control technology and systems that are unlikely
to be releasable to the international community, the UN SHIRBRIG is a more
applicable model for the standing headquarters. By tapping into the research
and development associated with the US SJFHQ, and the operational lessons
learned from the UN SHIRBRIG planning element, the African Union has an
opportunity to create an extremely capable standing headquarters tailored
specifically for its needs.
110
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Training and Readiness
Just as the AU can develop a standing headquarters from existing
models, so too can it develop a training plan from an existing capability—
Operation Focus Relief (OFR).
Following the rescue of 500 captured UN peacekeepers in Sierra Leone, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) offered
the UN 3,000 troops for peace operations. Concerned that these troops would
be as ill-prepared as those who had been captured, and in an effort to save the
UN another embarrassment, the United States undertook Operation Focus
Relief, a State Department initiative to train and equip these troops for peace
enforcement operations. OFR was developed as a training package specifically tailored for the battalions preparing for Chapter VII peace operations in
Sierra Leone. In mid-October 2000, US Special Forces commenced peace operations training with two Nigerian infantry battalions. Battalion-level training occurred over a ten-week period, beginning with small-unit tactics and
culminating in a battalion-level capstone exercise. As part of the OFR initiative, the United States included a common equipment package that enabled
the battalions to “shoot, move, and communicate.” Specifically, the West African battalions received a US light infantry battalion’s equivalent of individual and crew-served weapons, mortars, trucks, and radios. From start to
finish, Operation Focus Relief lasted 16 months, trained and equipped seven
battalions, and cost approximately $87.3 million.34
The OFR model is applicable for training the Tier One Brigade, with
slight variations. The OFR training package was specifically created for
those West African battalions preparing for immediate deployment to Sierra
Leone for UN peace operations. Developing an OFR-type training plan for a
standby brigade with a continental field of regard would require a more generic approach. Moreover, since the Tier One Brigade is by definition a
standby force, special emphasis would have to be given to arrival and assembly operations. Drawing from US Army, Marine Corps, and British peacekeeping doctrine, as well as lessons learned from African peacekeeping
missions, the tasks listed in Figure 2, on the following page, are recommended to be included in Tier One Brigade training.35
While the OFR initiative trained seven battalions in 18 months, the
first four battalions completed training in only eight months. Assuming the AU
selected battalions from lead nations whose militaries are at least as capable as
those that underwent OFR training, the battalions comprising the Tier One Brigade could complete training in one year. The additional four months would be
needed to achieve proficiency in the tasks listed in Figure 2, as well as to conduct a final evaluation exercise. A capstone exercise should be included as part
of the training syllabus to evaluate the brigade’s capability to rapidly deploy,
Winter 2004-05
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stabilize a deteriorating situation, and protect the civilian populace in the shortest possible time. To provide an accurate assessment of the brigade’s personnel
and operational readiness, this evaluation should include a scenario that provides for actual deployment to a nation capable of hosting the evaluation. One
location that satisfies this requirement is Djibouti, currently hosting Combined
Joint Task Force HOA forces.36 Using a location similar to Djibouti would hold
down costs, since no additional ranges or infrastructures would be necessary to
support the exercise. Moreover, if the capstone exercise is conducted at Camp
Lemonier, Djibouti, resident US joint forces could serve as role actors, improving the quality and reality of the evaluation.
Upon completion of its initial training, the Tier One Brigade should
continue periodic sustainment training. The requirement for sustainment
training is a lesson learned from Operation Focus Relief. While the OFR concept was successfully demonstrated, the effort was not sustained and those
battalions’ capabilities have since atrophied significantly. To ensure the Tier
One Brigade’s readiness does not degrade, periodic training must occur.
There are several possibilities from which to choose for sustainment training.
For example, the US Marine Corps and Navy participate in annual training
exercises with Kenyan troops in Kenya—one of the United States’ lead nations. If a Kenyan battalion were part of the Tier One Brigade, it could receive
proficiency training as part of a combined US-Kenyan exercise—an option
which bears relatively little additional expense.
Recommended Tier One Brigade Training for Peace Operations

• Arrival and assembly procedures

• Embarkation training

• Enforce UN sanctions

• Protect human rights

• Protect humanitarian relief efforts

• Separate warring factions

• Disarm belligerents

• Restore territorial integrity

• Restore law and order

• Supervise a truce or cease-fire

• Identify mines and unexploded

• Contribute to maintenance of law

ordnance

and order

• Monitor borders and boundaries

• Understand rules of engagement

• Roles of NGOs and PVOs

• Employing non-lethal technology

• Media interaction

• Detainee handling

• Anti-terrorism and force protection

• Physical security

measures

Figure 2. Recommended Tier One Training.
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To extend this option beyond Kenya, the international community
needs to expand its military-to-military engagement plan with Sub-Saharan
Africa. Currently US European Command, responsible for military engagement with most Sub-Sahara African countries, participates in four annual training exercises in the region. Conversely, the command participates in over 100
exercises on the European continent.37 As a component of the Tier One Brigade
program, additional combined training exercises involving the militaries of the
United States, the G8 countries, and Sub-Saharan Africa are required.
A second possibility for recurring training is for the international
community to deploy a team of trainers to the countries sourcing the individual Tier One battalions. During the OFR initiative, the United States used
Special Forces as trainers for the battalions. While Army Special Forces were
precisely the right units to provide initial OFR training, sustainment training
can draw support from alternate resources. For example, the Army National
Guard currently participates in programs through which state Guard units develop partnerships with the military of a state from the former Soviet Union.
A similar program could be applied to sustainment training for the Tier One
battalions. Regardless of which option is chosen, sustainment training is necessary to ensure the continuous effectiveness of the Tier One Brigade.
Logistics
Any international initiative for an African Standby Force must include a standardized equipment package. European colonialism and the Cold
War were driving forces in equipping the modern-day African militaries. If
the AU were presently to integrate four battalions from separate African
countries, the likely result would be a composite brigade with a hodgepodge
of nonstandard, non-interchangeable, and potentially incompatible military
equipment. A standardized equipment block is necessary to ensure battalions
deploy with operable equipment and to reduce the costs and complexities of
their logistical requirements. Moreover, this equipment block should be built
around the core competencies of the Tier One Brigade—speed and teeth. As
such, the Tier One Brigade should be equipped in the same manner as the Operation Focus Relief battalions—with light and medium trucks, personal and
crew-served weapons, mortars, and radio sets.
In addition to the standardized equipment block, a common supply
sustainment block should be included for the Tier One Brigade. In the US military, an expeditionary brigade deploys with 30 days of accompanying supplies. While a 30-day internal supply provides the optimum balance of
sustainment to embarkation footprint, it runs the risk of not satisfying
reality—on average, it has taken between three and six months from the time
the UN Security Council decides to establish a peacekeeping force until the
Winter 2004-05
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“Using ‘speed and teeth’ as the core competencies,
an African Standby Force could be created to . . .
meet the sense of urgency that the African
security environment demands.”

peacekeepers are deployed.38 Nevertheless, because rapid deployment is an
overarching principle for the Tier One Brigade, the African Union should accept the risk associated with a 30-day internal sustainment capability. To mitigate this risk, alternative methods to augment the Tier One Brigade’s organic
sustainability should be developed. Examples of alternative methods include
international community support agreements, host-nation support agreements, and regional prepositioned equipment and supplies.
Once the standardized equipment block and sustainment supplies
are sourced, the location of the central logistics facility, the Brigade Logistics
Site, should be determined. The most significant criterion for rapid deployment is the maturity of the site’s lines of communications, namely the condition of area ports, airfields, road networks, and telecommunications. While
the composite sum of these criteria may seem hard to fill, there are eligible locations. For example, the United States has a long-held formal agreement
with Kenya for the use of local military facilities. The port of Mombassa, and
airfields at Embakasi and Nanyuki, supported US intervention in Somalia in
1992-1994 and have been used recently to support forces involved in Combined Joint Task Force HOA. Other potential sites that should be considered
include Cape Town, South Africa, the ports of Luanda and Lobito in Angola,
the port of Dakar in Senegal, and Dar es Salaam in Tanzania.

Synchronizing the International Community
and American Leadership
The African Standby Force initiative is a unique opportunity for
the international community to engage the African Union and achieve a consensus solution to a vexing problem. Conversely, once this capability is
achieved, it is not an excuse for its disengagement from Africa. Even with
the successful training and fielding of an African Standby Force, any longterm success will ultimately succumb to international disengagement. Many
requirements will remain for the international community—requirements
that African countries do not have the capacity to meet. For example, strate114
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gic airlift, early warning, limited technical and logistical capacities, and AU
command and control are all gaps that the African Union has identified as requiring international assistance.39
The United States should not feel compelled to fill every void, nor
take on this daunting initiative alone—but it is one in which we should actively participate. For much of the 20th century, the international community,
as well as the American people, came to expect US moral leadership in humanitarian work as a reflection of our national character and status as a great
power. Participating in the development of the ASF perpetuates that expectation. Moreover, it provides an opportunity for the United States to achieve an
intriguing result—expending a relatively miniscule amount of American
hard power for a potentially significant gain in American soft power.
When US policymakers begin to examine our leadership role, they
should not fall victim to American hubris. Currently, many members of the
international community, inside and outside Africa, are already extensively
engaged in helping African states expand their capacity for peacekeeping.
For example, the French trained peacekeepers under their RECAMP program; the British have long been involved in training African peacekeepers;
the Netherlands has provided peacekeeping training to ECOWAS; and Belgium participated with the United States in the African Crisis Response Initiative. Although not specifically involved in peacekeeping initiatives, China
has become very active on the continent and recently developed the ChinaAfrica Cooperation Forum, a program designed “to conform to the changing
international situation.”40 Undoubtedly, each of these countries’ programs
has unique strengths. However, if individual countries continue with separate
and nonintegrated proposals, the result will be redundant programs, nonstandard equipment and training, and lost efficiencies. Current ad hoc arrangements are insufficient to guarantee credibility, speed, and effectiveness.
What is lacking is the venue to integrate these disparate activities under a single umbrella. Offering the African Union the civil and military expertise to
assist in creating an African Standby Force that captures the “best and brightest” international programs under a single, synergistic initiative is an example of the leadership role the United States should take.
As the planning, development, and fielding of the African Standby
Force occurs, the United States should lead with grace and humility. Achieving
the delicate balance of being, most likely, the largest single contributor to the
African Standby Force, and doing so in a humble manner will be a challenging
test. However, the ongoing dialogue between the African Union and the United
States is an encouraging sign that we can strike the necessary balance. Ultimately, the initiative cannot be developed in a vacuum, and the dialogue needs
to include all participating international peacekeeping and financing nations.
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A Prayer for Marie
When one thinks of humanitarian intervention in Africa, one likely
thinks of Somalia—not 1991 Somalia when US military intervention opened
up food supply lines and was widely supported publicly, but the Somalia of
3 October 1993 and the dramatic media depiction of an American soldier being
dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. Unfortunately, the early success in
addressing humanitarian needs has been replaced by the “Black Hawk Down
prism”—the lens through which all subsequent crises on the continent have
been viewed. When the next crisis came the following year in Rwanda, that
lens predictably clouded our policy decisions. It’s time to craft a new lens.
We need a lens that reflects a view of Africa very much unlike the
view most see today. The image would not be of impotent African militaries
paralyzed by a lack of funding, training, and logistics—incapable of effective
intervention in a humanitarian crisis. Rather, we need to look into the future
and see the international community bringing together a professional corps
of African soldiers ready to respond rapidly to an African crisis. Properly
trained and fully resourced, the African Standby Force should be well positioned to prevent future “Rwandas” and “Somalias.” It’s the prayer we can
offer for Marie.
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